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Approved For Release 2002/05/06 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600010026-1

14 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Counter-Spy: The Bulletin of the Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community

1. The UPI press ticker on 14 May announced that a news conference was to be held on that date by Tim Butz of the Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC). The announced subject was: "Opposition to William Colby to be CIA Director." CARIC is a new organization which published its first monthly (?) Bulletin, entitled Counter-Spy, in March 1973 and its second in May. It lists a Washington post office box as its address and offers annual subscription rates for Counter-Spy at \$6.00 for individuals, \$10.00 for institutions, and \$75.00 for agencies of the government. Prisoners and GI's may receive free copies.

2. CARIC's "current members" are listed in the first issue of the Bulletin as Winslow Peck, K. Barton Osborn, Gary Thomas, and Tim Butz. Those listed as "responsible" for the second issue are Butz, Osborn, and Peck. Winslow Peck is a pseudonym for Perry Fellwock. While serving in the Air Force, 1966-1969, Fellwock was assigned to NSA type duties in Turkey and South Viet Nam. It will be recalled that the August 1972 issue of Ramparts Magazine carried an article entitled "U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir," which was an interview with Winslow Peck, later identified as Fellwock, regarding NSA activities. Peck has had relationships with the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice and Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Little is known regarding Peck's other associates in CARIC - Osborn, Thomas, and Butz except that they have been noted as participants in the New Left, the National Peace Action Coalition, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and Scientists and Engineers for Social and Political Action.

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE  
OF E. O. 11652, AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT  
TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON

14 May 1983

(Insert date or event)

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3. Virtually all of the second (May) 1973 issue of Counter-Spy is devoted to a long article entitled "Pacification: The 100 Year Flight of the Phoenix." On page 7, the authors print a "partial list" of those responsible as Advisors/Designers of the Pacification/Phoenix/F-6 programs including General Lansdale and Ambassador Colby. They also list the CIA Station Chiefs [sic]/CAS Saigon as John Richardson, Peer De Silva, Mr. Jorganson [sic], John Hart, Ted Shackley, and Thomas Polgar.

4. The article touches on CIA's role with the PAT's and the PRU's, but there is nothing new in their general charges. A special section (page 24) is devoted to "We Demand William E. Colby's Resignation." Noting that Ambassador Colby headed the Phoenix Program, CARIC charges that "Under his direction, Phoenix agents practiced some of their most brutal forms of assassination and torture."

5. This section continues that, under oath before a House Subcommittee,

CPYRGHT

"Ambassador Colby lied concerning the nature of the Phoenix Program and misrepresented its cost in both number of victims and amount of mis-used public funds. As a reward for his having been the CIA's apologist for Phoenix, Mr. Colby has recently been appointed the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations . . . CARIC feels that a man who . . . has had a career of directing assassination and torture programs can play no legitimate part in U.S. government. We encourage all citizens to write their Congressional representative, the White House, and the Central Intelligence Agency to demand his resignation."

Presumably, Butz's press conference today will be more of the same.

6. In its first (March 1973) issue, CARIC's Bulletin, Counter-Spy, states in its introduction, that:

CPYRGHT

"Now former intelligence workers, Viet Nam Veterans, and concerned citizens have formed the Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC), to serve as an independent 'watchdog' on the government spy apparatus . . . to provide the vital information an aware public needs to know about government operations. The secrecy with which

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the government surrounds itself must stop. ... CARIC will serve as an independent publicly sponsored source of analysis and information on the practices, organization, and objectives of U.S. Intelligence." (page 1)

7. In the first issue, the initial "Commentary" notes the replacement of DCI Helms by Mr. Schlesinger as "an ominous turn of events." Citing Helms as a "professional," the "Commentary" notes the Agency's good performance as published in the Pentagon Papers. The authors charge that Mr. Schlesinger has had no previous experience in the Intelligence Community and did not come up through the ranks. They charge him with being a "yes man" and his appointment "a dangerous step." (pp. 2-3) The rest of the first issue is given over largely to the FBI's domestic surveillance role and a reprint of what is alleged to be the Domestic Intelligence section of the FBI's annual report. This issue also contains a form for the reader to fill out (page 13), listing the intelligence agencies of which he has been a member, presumably in an attempt to secure sources. This form is known as the "Questionnaire for the Winter Soldier Investigation into U.S. Intelligence."

8. Copies of the first two issues of Counter-Spy are attached. Like many "bulletins" of this type, it will probably run its course over a few issues and collapse for lack of funds.

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Walter Pforzheimer ✓  
Curator  
Historical Intelligence Collection

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - DDCI
- 1 - Exec.Sec. Mgmt. Comm.
- 1 - Asst. to the DCI, Mr. Thuermer
- 1 - Director of Security
- 1 - Chief, CI Staff
- 1 - General Counsel
- 2 - HIC

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
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# COUNTER-SPY

THE BULLETIN OF:  
THE COMMITTEE FOR ACTION/RESEARCH  
ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

MAY, 1973  
VOL. 1  
NO. 2

75¢



Phung - Hoàng

ports but ignored by a vast segment of the US press.

By 1959 only twenty-three agrovilles had been constructed when the program was abandoned by the Saigon government. The agrovilles had been operated by the GVN under several naive assumptions. First the GVN anticipated that the peasants would have a spontaneous enthusiasm for the program, their enthusiasm being sparked by bribes and rewards. This did not happen because the peasants would more often be beaten by the governments agents who kept the rewards for themselves.

The second naive assumption was the belief that competent cadres for administrative posts would emerge from the rural population. Instead, corruption became instilled in the GVN. For the most part the agrovillage effort tried to instill pacification by fear and terror. The NLF did the exact opposite and won the confidence of the rural population. As the NLF's strength in the countryside increased, Diem lost more and more control of the population and by 1961 the Agrovillage Program had failed.

#### STRATEGIC HAMLETS

To meet the increasing presence of the NLF, the Saigon government initiated the first of the truly massive pacification efforts - Ap Chien Luoc or Strategic Hamlets. The program was officially instituted in March, 1962 with both US Mission and Diem's brother Ngu being the chief proponents. The Saigon government created the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets which assumed all responsibility for the program.

The purpose of the program was to achieve the widest possible control over the population by the Saigon government. The immediate security objectives of the program were two-fold; first, to sever the communication and control lines of the NLF to the rural population and thus deny the "fish" from the "sea." Second, to promote a nation-wide self-defense effort. In addition to these immediate objectives, the Strategic Hamlet program was designed to have important implications for the long-range development of the GVN. It was hoped by Diem and his US advisors that the program would create a social, economic and political infrastructure in the countryside which would uproot the

ancestral ties of the peasants and thus their loyalty to the community-based NLF and implant a lasting political administration at the local level loyal to Saigon.

The hamlet is the smallest organized community in rural Vietnam. Several hamlets make up a village, however under the Strategic Hamlet program both hamlets and villages were fortified.

#### PARTIAL LIST OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR

##### PACIFICATION/PHOENIX/F-6

##### ADVISORS/DESIGNERS

E.G. Lansdale, Major Gen., USAF(ret.)  
Sir Robert G.K. Thompson  
Dep. Amb. William J. Porter  
Amb. Robert Komer  
Amb. William E. Colby  
Amb. Norman L. Sweat  
FSR George D. Jacobson, SAAFFO

##### AMBASSADORS

Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge  
Amb. Maxwell D. Taylor, Gen. ARMY(ret.)  
Amb. Ellsworth Bunker  
Amb. Graham Martin

##### COMUSMACV

Gen. William C. Westmoreland  
Gen. Creighton W. Abrams  
Gen. Fredrick Weyland

##### CIA Station Chiefs/CAS SAIGON

John Richardson  
Peer De Silva  
Mr. Jorganson  
John Hart  
Ted Shackley  
Thomas Polgar

##### PRESIDENTS

Dwight David Eisenhower  
John Fitzgerald Kennedy  
Lyndon Baines Johnson  
Richard Milhaus Nixon

The primary security force created in the Strategic Hamlet period of pacification was the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). The largest component of the RVNAF, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was created at the end of the war by decree of Bao Dai, and many of the

program aimed at eliminating a practical problem -- the VC infrastructure. When questioned concerning the unaccounted-for 1.7 billion dollars which had financed much of the covert aspect of Phoenix (agent payments, PRU equipment, etc.), Ambassador Colby assured the committee that, while Phoenix was less than well-controlled at its "early stages" (referring to the pre-computer days), all the main problems had been resolved and that the Congress could rest assured that aberrations of brutality would remain at a minimum. No, he did not know how many innocent victims the program had killed, maybe 5,000, maybe more. No, he did not have the authority to discuss the reasons why the Congress could not audit 1.7 billion dollars' worth of taxpayers funds which went to CORDS. This is as close to the truth as the Congress has ever come. (see insert)

The significance of the above testimony, however, is not that a high-ranking official has misled Congress. Rather the fact that the laws, directives and practices of what was until 1971 actively known as the Phoenix Program have not been repealed. In fact, the only change which has been made in the continuing policy of VCI neutralization is, like all other covert operations, that its cover name has been changed. The program has been re-designated, and now takes its name from the rating given to the least verifiable type of intelligence information which justifies VCI neutralization. The name of the program is now "F-6". In an attempt to call attention to the fact that, among other crimes, Phoenix and F-6 have now generated close to 300,000 political prisoners in the South Vietnamese prisons, a member of the GVN House of Deputies, Ho Ngoc Nhuan, wrote in a Jan. 18, 1973 article that:

*"A new program, with only the name of F-6, is being secretly installed to replace the (US) CIA-organized Phoenix program, discontinued recently. Like its predecessor, the new program is aimed at "neutralizing" suspected Viet Cong cadre and sympathizers.*

*"Suspects, under F-6, can now be arrested for an immense range of reasons, and the accusation of one person is enough for capture. Individuals and families who might, in the past, have had some contact with "the other side", perhaps only a relative in the North or in the NLF, are now under suspicion.*

*There is hardly a family in the South free from "taint", including the highest ranking government officials. Even Thieu's own people are complaining privately about F-6 which hangs over everyone's head like a guillotine."*

Two first-hand accounts of torture and brutality have recently been published by Jean-Pierre Debris and Andre Menras, two French schoolteachers who had been arrested and imprisoned under Phoenix/F-6 authority in July of 1970. Tortured and kept at Chi Hoa prison for two and a half years, Debris and Menras were fin-

#### WE DEMAND WILLIAM E. COLBY'S RESIGNATION


*Ambassador William E. Colby, in his role as Director of the US Cords mission in Vietnam, headed the Phoenix Program at the height of US ground troop involvement. Under his direction, Phoenix agents practiced some of their most brutal forms of assassination and torture.*

*Under oath before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, Ambassador Colby lied concerning the nature of the Phoenix Program and misrepresented its cost in both number of victims and amount of mis-used public funds. As a reward for his having been the CIA's apologist for Phoenix, Mr. Colby has recently been appointed the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations (clandestine services -- an office which constitutes 60% of the CIA's total operations).*

*CARIC feels that a man who, like the fabled Old Man of the Mountain, has had a career of directing assassination and torture programs can play no legitimate part in US government. We encourage all citizens to write their Congressional representative, the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency to demand his resignation.*

*ally released in late December of 1972, after their plight was brought to the attention of the French people who in turn put the pressure of public outrage on the French government and obtained the two's release. Their view if "F-6" is that: "the idea that F-6 will yield less than the hundreds of thousands of victim which Phoenix did is naive, and probably very underestimated..."*

*It is important to examine the arrest procedure which allows such people as the above Frenchmen to be included in*

	<p>Approved For Release 2002/05/06 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600010026-1</p> <p><b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</b> Office of Legislative Counsel Washington, D. C. 20505 Telephone: 351-6121 (Code 143-6121) 15 May 1973</p>
<b>TO:</b>	<p><b>Mr. Guy McConnell</b> <b>Committee on Appropriations</b> <b>United States Senate</b></p>
<p><i>[Faint, illegible text]</i></p>	

*Recd. Gen.*

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JMM: *and [unclear]*

Mr. Pf called, said in connection with the memo he handed you last night that one of the editors of that publication was on TV last night and said they gave documentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee in an attempt to block Colby's nomination.

*N*  
*for*  
*R*

*noted*  
*[initials]*

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